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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JERRY SINE AND DORA SINE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MILDRED IONA HARPER, Admin-




Case No. 7386 
STATEMENT OF THE ~CASE 
This is an appeal from the Decree of Reformation 
entered April 25, 1949, in the Third Judicial District . 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, purporting to 
reform a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the sale of 
real estate from Cathrine Jensen, defendant's testator, 
to the :plaintiffs Jerry and Dora· Sine. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs, Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, his wife, 
on or about the 27th day of July, 1947, employed a 
Real Estate Agent by the name of Dowell to see if he 
could negotiate a deal for the purchase in their behalf 
of some real estate consisting of a lot and duplex to use 
in connection with thei~ auto court. Dowell determined 
the owner to be Cathrine Jensen and after two or three 
visits with her obtained her signature on an Earnest 
M·oney Receipt and Agreement agreeing to sell the prop-
erty located at 656-658 West North Temple Street, in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, for $8,500.00 with $1,500.00 down and 
payments of $75.00 per month for the first two years and 
after two years payments to be reduced to $60.00. Subse-
quently Dowell obtained from Cathrine Jensen an ab-
stract and took it to his office where under his instruc-
tions a Uniform Real Estate Contract was prep·ared, 
dated the 31st day of July, 1949, including the above 
terms, and describing the real estate as a tract 115 feet 
in depth with a 49¥2 foot frontage on West North Tem·ple 
Street. This contract was subsequently signed by all par-
ties. Between this tract ·and that already owned by the 
plaintiffs as part of their auto court is a tract of vacant 
property 115 feet deep with a 25lf2 fo-ot frontage also 
owned by the said Cathrine Jensen, which is the subject 
of this controversy. 
Plaintiffs claim that it was the intention of all 
p~arties that the contract was for the purchase of the 
25lf2 foot tract a.s well as for the 49lf2 foot tract, and 
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that the description of only the 49¥2 foot tract got 
into the contract by mistake. Plaintiffs notified Cathrine 
Jensen of the alleged mistake and asked her for· a nevv 
contract eoYering both tracts, vvhich she refused to 
giYe, and plaintiffs brought this action against her for 
reformation of the contract. Cathrine Jensen answered 
plaintiffs' complaint denying that sh~ had ever intended 
to sell anything other than the 49¥2 tract, that there 
"~as no mistake on her part, and that the action was 
barred by the statute of frauds, Section 33-5-3, Utah 
Code .... \nnotated 1943. Before the case could be brought 
to trial, Cathrine Jensen died, and Mildred Iona Harper 
\Yho w·as appointed Executrix of her estate, was sub-
stituted as defendant in the action by Jerry and Dora 
Sine. 
To clarify the issues for the court, we set out 
plaintiffs' complaint, together with defendant's answers 
to the allegations therein and ·plaintiffs' reply: 
CO~fPLAIN'T AS ANSWERED 
For their cause of action against the defendant 
plaintiffs allege: 
1. Plaintiffs and defendant are, and at all times 
herein mentioned were, residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. (Admitted by defendant.) 
2. Plaintiffs are, and at all times herein mentioned 
were, the owners of the following described tract of 
land in Salt Lake County, Utah, to wit: 
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Commencing 75 feet East of the Southwest 
corner of Lot 3, Block 61, Plat "C ", Salt Lake 
City Survey, and running thence East 151 feet; 
thence North 127 feet; thence East 104 feet; 
thence North 58 feet; thence West 11 feet; thence 
North 104 feet; thence East 11 feet; thence North 
·41 feet; thence West 206 feet; thence South 12 
feet; thence West 112 feet; thence South 191 
feet; thence East 112 feet; thence South 12 feet; 
thence West 49 feet; thence South 115 feet; to 
the place of beginning; together with a right of 
way over the following: Commencing 124- feet 
East and 115 feet North of the Southwest corner 
of said Lot 3 and running thence 124 feet; thence · 
North 215 feet; thenc~ East 124 feet; thence 
South 12 feet; thence West 112 feet; thence 
South 191 feet; thence East 112 ·feet; thence 
South 12 feet to the place of beginning. 
(Admitted ·by defendant.) 
3. Defendant is, and at all times herein mentioned -
was, the owner of legal title to property adjoining the 
p~roperty described in Paragraph 2 hereof, which prop-
erty is more particularly descibed as follows, to wit: 
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Lot 
3, Block 61, Plat '' C' ', Salt Lake City Survey, 
and running thence East 75 feet; thence North 
115 feet to an alley; thence West along the South 
side of said alley 75 feet; thence South 115 feet 
to place of beginning; together with a right of 
way over said alley, the same being 12 feet wide 
and extending from Western Avenue to the West 
end of said tract. 
(Admitted by defendant.) 
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4. On or about July 27, 1947, an agent of plaintiffs 
acting in their behalf entered into an oral agreement 
W'ith defendaD:t for the purchase of defendant's prop-
erty described in Paragraph 3 at a price of $8,500.00; 
that on July 29, 1947, the said oral agreement was 
reduced to 'vriting in the form of an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Agreement, copy of which is attached here-
to as Exhibit ''A'' and by this reference made a part 
hereof. (Defendant admitted the execution of the 
Earnest :Jioney Receipt and Agreement, but denied aU 
other allegations.) 
5. That it "\vas and is the understanding of the 
parties that Exhibit ''A'' covered the property of de-
fendant described in Paragraph 3 hereof and was the 
property adjoining the property of plaintiffs and on 
tlte West thereof. (Denied by defendant.) 
6. That on or about August 9, 1947, plaintiffs 
caused their attorneys to examine the abstract submitted 
to plaintiffs by defendant and supposed by plaintiffs to 
cover the property described in Paragraph 3 and on 
or about said date plaintiffs caused their aforementioned 
agent to prepare a Uniform Real Estate Contract cover-
ing said property, which contract was dated July 31, 
1947, and executed on or about August 10, 1947, copy 
of which is attached hereto as· Exhibit '' B '' and by 
this reference made a part hereof; and that in executing 
said agreement the plaintiffs relied on their attorneys 
and their agent as aforesaid to safeguard plaintiffs in 
the ,purchase of the said property and execute Exhibit 
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"B" in the belief that the said contract covered the 
property described in Paragraph 3 and adjoined plain-
tiffs' property. (Defendant admitted the execution of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract, but denied the other 
allegations for lack of knowledge.) 
7. That plaintiffs have information which they 
believe and therefore allege as a fact that defendant jn 
signing Exhibits ''A'' and '' B'' did so in the belief 
and with the understanding that she was selling to 
plaintiffs the property described in Paragraph 3 hereof 
and that she later discovered the mistake that had been 
made, which discovery was made on or about July 
15, 1948. (Denied by defendant.) 
8. That plaintiffs discovered the abovementioned 
mistake on or about July 17, 1948, and forthwith re-
quested defendant to correct said mistake by reformi!Tg 
Exhibit "B" to conform to the intentions of the parties 
with reference thereto and that defendant ·thereupon 
refused and has since refused to rewrite said agreen1ent· 
although demand therefor has been made upon her so 
to do. (Denied by defendant.) 
WHEREFORE, :plaintiffs pray judgment against 
the defendant that the contract between the parties 
dated July 27, 1947, be corrected and reformed to cover 
that tract of land 75 feet by 115 feet together with right 
of way over alley to the North which adjoins the prop-
erty of plaintiffs in Block 61, Plat "C ", Salt Lake City 
Survey, according to the intentions of the parties at 
the t_ime said agreement was executed and that plaintiffs 
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and different relief as the court 8hall find to be equitable . 
.. A.s a further ans,ver to plaintiffs' complaint, and as 
an affir1uative defense thereto, defendant alleged a~ 
follo" .. s: 
1. Defendant acquired the property described in 
paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' complaint by t"·o separate 
con,eyanres at different times and from different 
grantors, to-,vit: 
Parcell 
Commencing at the South,Yest corner of Lot 
3, Block 61, Pia t ' ' C '', Salt Lake City Survey, 
and running thence East 491/2 feet ; thence North 
115 feet; to an alley; thence 'Vest along the South 
side of said Alley 49¥2 feet; thence South 115 
feet to the place of beginning. 
acquired from Catherine H. Hardy by warranty deed 
dated September 24, 1930. 
Parcel2 
Beginning at a point 49¥2 feet East from the 
Southwest corner of Lot 3, Block 61, Plat "C ", 
Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence East 
25¥2 feet; thence North 115 feet; thence West 
25% feet; thence South 115 feet, to the place of 
beginning. 
acquired from Pehr J. W. von Ehrenheim by warranty 
deed dated May 2, 1939. 
2. That on or about July 29, 1947, defendant 
signed a written agreement prepared by her agent, in 
the form of the Earnest Money Receipt attached to 
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plaintiffs' complaint as Exhibit "A", for the sale to 
plaintiffs of the said Parcel 1 as described above. 
3. That on or about July 29, 1947, defendant de-
livered to plaintiffs an abstract, well knowing and 
understanding that said abstract covered only said 
Parcel 1. 
4. That never at any time did defendant sell, con. 
tract to sell, either orally or by writing, or intend to 
sell Parcel 2 to plaintiffs. 
5. That plaintiffs' action is barred _by the pro-
visions of Section 33-5-3, Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
'VHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiffs 
take nothing by their complaint, and that defendants go 
hence V{ith their costs, and ·for such other relief as to 
the court shall seem fit and proper. 
In their Reply to Defendant's Answer plaintiffs 
denied the allegations of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the 
affir1native defense, and alleged with reference to sai'l 
affirmative defense that if the defendant acted in the 
manner alleged in paragraphs-3 and 4 of the affirmative 
_defense she defrauded the plaintiffs knov\ring full well 
that the plaintiffs bargained for, agreed to buy, intended 
to buy, and thought they were acquiring the_ property 
-adjoining that alreaqy owned by plaintiffs and lying 
immediately west of said property of plain tiffs. 
T:r:ial was had upon the issues raised by the above 
pleadings at which Jerry and Dora Sine were permitted 
to testify over the objection of the defendant's attornev ,, 
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that it 'Yas their intention to purchase the 25¥2 foot 
piece as 'Yell a.s the 49~·~ foot piece, and that they 
thought that the Uniforn1 Real Estate Contract finally 
entered into contained a description that covered both 
tracts, although they ad1nitted that they didn't read 
the contract. :Jir. Do"'ell 'Yas also perinitted to testify 
as to his instructions fron1 :Jir. Sine to the effect that 
he 'Yas to purchase the property adjoining the Sine 
property, "~hich '""as objected to by defendant's counsel. 
The court further permitted Dow·ell to testify concern-
ing negotiations and conversations with Cathrine J en-
sen, over objections of 9-efendant's counsel that he was 
an incompetent witness under the "dead man's statute", 
Section 104-49-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1943. De-
fendant's motion to strike all of the above testimony, 
and her motion for nonsuit at the end of plaintiffs' 
case were denied by the trial court. Defendant's wit-
nesses, including herself, two other daughters of Cath-
rine Jensen, Mr. J. C. J~nsen, surviving husband of 
Cathrine Jensen, and C. W. Biddinger, former husband 
of Cathrine Jensen all testified to statements of Mrs. 
Jensen before her death, both before and soon after· the 
transaction in issue, to the effect that it was .her inten-
tion not to sell the 25¥2 foot piece,· but rather to erect 
a small building on it either for residential or business 
purposes. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
The trial court made the following Findings of 
F~u·,t and Conclusions of Law in favor of the plaintiffs: 
1. Cathrine Jensen, the original defendant, passed 
a\\·ay on or about November 26, 1948, and the defendant 
Mil<lr:ed lona Harper was duly appointed executrix of 
t1H· estate of Cathrine Jensen, deceased, on January 5, 
1949, and. was substituted as defendant in the above-
Pntitled action by order of the court dated February 
9, 1949. 
2. In February 1946 the plaintiffs became the 
O\rners of a tract of land in Block 61, Plat "C ", Salt 
Lake City Survey, on the north side of West North 
Ten1ple between 5th West and 6th West, Salt Lakt~ 
City, Utah, being more particularly described as follows, 
Commencing 75 feet East of the Southwest 
corner of Lot 3, Block 61, Plat '' C '', Salt Lake 
City Survev, and running thence East 151 feet; 
the~ce X o~th 127 feet; thence East 104 feet; 
thence North 58 feet; thence West 11 feet; thence 
X orth 104 feet; thevce East 11 feet; thence North 
41 feet; thence West 206 feet; thence South 12 
feet; thence West 112 feet; thence South 191 
feet; thence East 112 feet; thence South 12 feet; 
thence \"\Test 49 feet; thence South 115 feet to the 
pJace of beginning; together with a right of way 
over the following: Commencing 124 feet East 
and 115 feet North of the Southwest corner of 
said Lot 3 and running thence West 124 feet; 
thence North 215 feet; thence East 124 feet; 
thence South 12 feet; thence West 112 feet; 
thence South 191 feet; thence East 112 feet; 
thence South 12 feet to the ,pJace of beginning. 
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3. In the fall of 1946 the plaintiffs pnrehasPd an 
:~ additional tract of land in said tract, being 33 x 125 
lin.:: feet in dimension in a northerly and easterly di rf\etion 
. * from a point 127 feet ~ orth and 12 feet East of th~ 
South"~est corner of Lot 3 in said block, thus coin-
::: pleting purchase by the plaintiffs of all of the property 
shown in pink on Exhibit B in this cause. 
4. ..._-\..t all tin1es herein mentioned Cathrine Jensen 
and the defendant as executrix of the estate of Cathrine 
Jensen, deceased, have held legal title to property ad-
joining· the property described in finding 2 hereof, which 
property is more particularly described as follo,vs, 
,' to-wit: 
Commencing at the Southwest corner of Lot 
3, Block 61, Plat '~' C' ', Salt Lake Survey, anq 
running thence East 75 feet; thence North 115 
feet to an alley; thence West along the South 
side of said alley 75 feet; thence South 115 feet 
to place of beginning; together with a right of 
way over said alley, the same being 12 feet wide 
and extending from Western Avenue to the 
West end of said tract. 
5. On or about July 27, 1947, plaintiffs instructed 
their agent to purchase in their behalf the property 
described in the next preceding paragraph from the 
owner of said property and on or about said date the 
said agent, acting in behalf of the plaintiffs, entered 
into an oral agreement with Cathrine Jensen for the 
purchase of said property at , a price of $8,500.00 and 
on July 29, 1947, .the said oral agreement was reduced 
to writing in the form of an Earnest Money Receipt 
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and Agreement, which is Exhibit A in this cause, and 
was signed by the respective parties thereto. 
6. It was and is the understanding of the plain-
tiffs that Exhibit C covered the p.roperty of defendant 
described in finding 4 hereof and was the -property 
adjoining the front portion of the property of plaintiff~ 
and lying immediately to the west thereof. 
7. On or about July 31, 1947, and within a few 
days thereafter, the plaintiffs and Cathrine Jensen, 
deceased, entered into a real estate contract, copy of 
which is Exhibit D in this cause. 
8. In -executing Exhibit D, the plaintiffs relied on 
their attorneys and their agent as aforesaid to safe-
guard plaintiffs in the purchase of said property and 
executed the original of Exhibit D in the belief and 
with the un~erstanding that said Exhibit D covered 
the property described in finding 4 and ·adjoined plain-
tiffs' property as herein -described. 
9. Cathrine Jensen executed Exhibit C and the 
original of Exhibit D in the belief and with the under-
standing that she vvas selling to plaintiffs the property 
described in finding 4 hereof and that she discovered 
a mistake in the description contained in the original 
of Exhibit D either in September or November 1947. 
10. Plaintiffs discovered the above mentioned mis-
take on or about July 24, 1948, •and forth"\\rith requested 
Cathrine Jensen to correct said mistake by reforming 
the original of Exhibit D to conform to the intentions 
of the parties with reference thereto and so as to de-
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scribe the property de~cribed in finding 4 hereof, which 
Cathrine Jensen and later the executrix of her estate 
refused to do. 
11. In entering into the original of Exhibit D, the 
plaintiffs bargained for all of the property described in 
finding 4 and would not have entered into the s~aid con-
tract had they knovvn that Exhibit D did not correctly 
describe the said prop.erty. 
Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court 
makes the follo\ving 
CO~CLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. At the time the original of Exhibit D was en-
tered into the plaintiffs and Cathrine Jensen had bar-
gained f<:>r and believed that the transaction ~and sale 
covered the property adjoining property owned by the __ 
plaintiffs and being a piece with 75 feet frontage and 
115 feet in depth. 
2. The original of Exhibit D erroneously de-
scribed the intention and- understanding of the parties 
with reference to the description of the land, and plain-
tiff·s would not- have entered into the said contract or 
have made the said purchase for the land actually de-
scribed in the original of Exhibit D. 
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment reform-
ing the contract between the parties to_ cover the land 
intended by the p·arties to be sold by Cathrine Jensen 
to the plaintiffs on or about July 31, 1947. 
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4. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs in this 
action against the estate of Cathrine Jensen or Cather-
ine Jensen, deceased. 
In its decree of reformation the trial court ordered 
the defendant to execute and deliver to the plaintiffs 
a new contract describing the 25¥2 foot piece as "rell 
as the 49lj2 foot tract. 
Defendant obtained an order from the Probat~ 
Court "\\Thich has jurisdiction over the estate of Cath .. · 
rine Jensen, for authorization to appeal to the Supreme 
Court from the decree of reformation and for authority 
to file an undertaking for costs and to execute the 
contract as ordered by the trial court and deliver it 
to the clerk of said court as required by Section 104-
41-10, Utah Code Annotated 1943. Defendant now ap-
peals to this court for a reversal of said lower court 'H 
judgment. 
Further facts and details of testimony as might 
be helpful to the court will appear hereafter in ap~ 
pellant's argument. 
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ST.A.TE~IE~T OF ERRORS RELIED UPON FOR 
RE,~ERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT 
The court erred : 
1. In overruling defendant's demurrer to plain-
tiffs' complaint for the reason that it did not state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and 
that said cause of action \Yas barred by the provision~ 
of Section 33-5-3 Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
2. In admitting hearsay evidence of plaintiffs' in-
structions and statements to their agent, D·owell. 
3. In admitting parol evidence to vary the terms 
of a \vritten instrument. 
4. In admitting evidence to set up an oral con-
tract in violation of the statute of frauds. 
5. In admitting testimony of a witness rendered 
incom~p.etent by the "dead man's statute", Section 104-
49-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
6. In refusing to grant defendant ~s motion for 
non-suit on the ground that the plaintiffs had not sus-
tained their burden to make out a. prima facie case of 
mutual mistake. 
7. In finding that plain tiffs instructed their agent 
to purchase the 25lf2 foot tract as well as the 49lj2 foot 
tract. 
8. In finding that the plaintiffs' agent entered 
into an oral agreement with Cathrine Jensen for the 
purchase of the 25lf2 foot tract as well as the 49lj2 foot 
tract. 
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9. In finding that the plaintiffs believed and un-
derstood Exhibits C and D covered the 25lf2 foot tract 
as well as the 49¥2 foot tract. 
10. In finding that Cathrine Jensen executed Ex-
hibit C and the original of Exhibit D in the belief and 
understanding that they covered the 25lf2 foot tract as 
"\vell as the 49Jj2 foot tract. 
11. In finding that ·Cathrine Jensen discovered her 
alleged mistake in September or November, 1947. 
12. In finding that plaintiffs bargained for the 25¥2 
foot tract as well as the 49Jj2 foot tract and that they 
would not have executed Exhibit D had they kno,vn . 
that it did not cover the 25lf2 foot tract. 
13. In concluding as a matter of law that the 
plain tiffs and Ca thrine Jensen believed the transaction 
and sale included the 251f2 feet and that Exhibit D 
erroneously described the property intended by the 
parties to be sold. 
14. In concluding that plaintiffs are entitled to a 
judgment reforming the contract to include the 25¥2 
foot tract ~and that plaintiffs are entitled to costs. 
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... \PPELL~\~T'S ARGUMENTS 
Each assig-nment of error will not be taken up 
separately in this brief. Assignrnents 2, 3, 7 and 9 
are discussed under Argun1ent I; Assignment 3 will be 
taken up under Argument II; Assignments 1, 4, 12 
and 1~ are discussed in Argument III; Assignment 5 
under Argument I\'-; and Assignments 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, 13 and 14 ""'ill be taken up in Argument V. 
Ap·pellant's arguments are as follows and will be 
considered in the following order : 
I. THE COURT ERR.ED IN PERMITTING 
HERESAY EVID~ENCE OF THE STATEMENTS OF 
PLAINTIFFS TO THEIR AGENT CONCERNING 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE THE 25% FOOT 
TRACT, AND IN FINDING THAT SUCH WERE 
THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT PLAINTIFFS 
INTENDED TO PURCHASE THE SAID 25% FOOT 
TRACT. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ANY 
TESTIMONY THE EFFECT OF WHICH WAS TO 
VARY THE TERMS-OF THE WRITTEN UNIFORM 
REAL ·E·STATE CONTRAC·T. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND 
DECREEING THAT THERE WAS- A CONTRACT 
FOR THE SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE 25V2 
FOOT TRACT OF LAND NOT DESCRIBED IN THE 
WRITTEN UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
AS SUCH CONTRACT IS WiiTHIN THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS. 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE WITNESS, DOWELL, TO TESTIFY TO CON-
VERSATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WIT·H CATH-
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RINE JENSEN IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 104-
49-2 (3), UTAH ·CODE ANNO'TATED 1943. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF 
REFORMATION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF A MUTUAL 
MISTAKE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE UNI-
FORM REAL ES·TATE ·CONTRA:CT . 
. 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING HERE-
SAY EVIDENCE OF THE STATEMENTS OF 
PLAINTI·FFS TO THEIR AGENT CONCERNING 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PURCHASE THE 25¥2 FOOT 
TRACT, AND· IN FINDING THAT SUCH 'WERE 
THE INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT PLAINTIFFS 
INTENDED TO PURCHASE THE SAID 25¥2 FOOT 
TRACT. 
In spite of, the fact that there exists as the sub-
ject matter of this lawsuit a written Uniform Real 
Estate Contract the terms of which are clear and unam-
biguous, and the parties to which of their own free 
will and choice signed, the trial court found that the 
parties to the eon tract in tended to agree to something 
other than what was expressed in it. As evidence of 
what the plaintiffs intended when negotiating and en-
tering into this contract the court permitted both the 
p.Iaintiffs and their agent, Dowell, to testify to conver-
sations had regarding the instructions given ·by plain-
tiffs to Dowell for the purchase of real estate outside 
the presence of the defendant or her testator, Cathrine 
Jensen. 
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.... \t T. 62 in an8\YPr to counsel's question, "What 
directions did he give you'?'', D·owell, over the o bjec-
tion of defendant's attorney, \Yas permitted to ans\ver 
as follo\vs : 
.... \. He said, "I am interested in acquiring 
a property next to 1ny auto court." He said, 
dit belongs to a woman named Jensen, or some 
people named Jensen'' . . . As I recall the con-
versation the property consisted of a vacant lot 
and of a duplex and I said, '' Ho\v much do 
you "\Vant to pay for it~" He says, "I under-
stand it can be bought for $8,500.00 but,'' he says, 
"I don't think it is worth that much." 
It is clear that this statement being made out of court 
and not subject to cross examination was hearsay and 
inadmissible. 
At T. 19 in answer to counsel's question, "What 
\Yere your original instructions to Mr. Dowell \Yith 
reference to this property~", plaintiff, Jerry Sine, 
\Yas permitted over objection of defendant's counsel, 
to answer as follows: 
A. I told Mr. Dowell that I would like to 
purchase the property west of my property, the 
corner p~roperty, so that I could square my 
property that was in the rear. May I also tell 
him what else I told him~ 
This also was hearsay testimony. 'Statements made by 
a witness to other persons are no exception to the 
~ 
hearsay rule. Evidence of what a witness has said out 
of court should not be received to fortify his testimony. 
Other instances of admission of this sort of hearsay 
evidence are f'Ound at T. 26, T. 27 and T. 28. 
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It follows that since the above testimony was hear-
say and incompetent it should not have been admitted 
nor considered by the trial court in determining 
whether or not the plaintiffs intended something other 
than that expressed by the cle·ar and unambiguous lan-
guage of the written instrument. 
II . 
. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING ANY 
TESTIMONY THE EFFECT OF WHICH WAS TO 
VARY THE TERMS OF THE WRITTEN UNIFORM 
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT. 
The terms of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
entered into between the plaintiffs and Cathrine Jen-
sen were clear and unambiguous, and comprised a com-
plete bilateral executory contract. The execution of 
such contract superseded ·all the preceding oral nego-
tiations and stipulations between Mr. Dowell and Cath-
rine Jensen concerning its terms and the subject prop-
erty ; and the testimony of Mr. Dowell as to conversa-
tions and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous 
with the execution of the written contract is inadmiss-
ible to contradict, change or add to the terms plainly 
incorporated into ·and made a part of the written con-
tract. The Utah statute in reference to this rule bf 
evidence is Section 104-48-15, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, which reads as follows : 
''There can be no evidence of the contents of 
a writing, other than the writing itself, except 
in the following cases: 
(Exceptions not applicable here) 
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The annotations to this section include the Utah cases 
of Fox Film Corp. vs. Ogden Theatre Co., Inc., 82 Utah 
279, 17 Pac. 2d 294, 90 A.L.R. 1299; B. T. Moran, Inc. 
vs. First Security C'Orp., 82 Utah 316, 24 Pac. 2d 384; 
and Last Chance Ranch Co. vs. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 
25 Par. 2d 952. In the Last Chance Ranch Co. case the 
plaintiff sued for specific performance of an oral con-
tract to transfer '66 shares of stock in a loan company 
"\\:"'~hich were alleged to haYe been purchased together 
with the real property for 'Yhich a deed had been exe-
cuted and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff offered oral testimony of statements made at 
'· the time of delivery of the deed 'vith respect to such 
agreement, and it 'vas held that the lower court prop-
erly excluded it as varying the terms of the deed. In 
the B. T. Moran Inc. case there "'\Yas a written contract 
for the purchase of w·allets providing that the seller 
would furnish bank-purchaser operators to manage a 
savings account campaign. Admission of p.arol · evi-
dence that the seller's agent represented that such 
operators would be experienced in the savings account 
business and especially trained in sales psychology was 
held to be reversible error. In the Fox Film Corp. case 
the defendant had entered into a written contract with 
the plaintiff corporation for the use of news reels over 
a period of a year. Because they were found to be old 
films, when they arrived, the defendant refused them, 
and, in that case, defended against ·an action for the 
balance due on the contract. It was held that the of-
fered testimony to the effect that plaintiff's agent rep-
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resented to defendant that these would be the latest 
reels was inadmissible as adding stipulations to the 
written contract. The court said that "rhere there is 
an obvious ambiguity in the writing extraneous evi-
dence of custom and circumstances might be admitted 
to help clarify the ambiguous terms, but ''direct oral 
evidence as to representation in the nature of warr~an­
ties or as to statements that are in effect stipulations 
may not be received . . . The exceptions to the parol 
evidence rule pertain usually to informal writings, in-
complete memoranda, unilateral documents and other 
writings that do not purport to set forth the entire 
contract. In cases involving complete contracts signed 
by the parties thereto and purporting to contain all 
their promises, representations and undertakings, the 
rule is ·more -strictly applied.'' 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DE-
CREEING THAT- THERE WAS A CONTRACT FOR 
THE SALE AND PURCHASE OF THE 25lf2 FOO·T 
TRACT OF LAND NOT DESCRIBED IN THE 
WRITTEN UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
AS SUCH ·CONTRACT IS WITHIN ;THE ·STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS. 
One of the terms of the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract involved in this action is that 
''there are no representations, covenants, or 
agreements between the parties hereto with ref-
erence to said property except as herein spe-
cifically set forth or attached hereto.'' 
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The terms of the Earnest nioney Receipt and Agree-
ment include the follo,ving: 
and 
'• Contract of sale or instrument of conveyance 
to be made on the approved form of the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board" 
"It is understood and agreed that the terms 
"~ritten in this receipt constitute the entire Pre-
liminary Contract between the Buyer and Seller 
and that no verbal statements made by a repre-
sentative of the Agent relative to this trans-
action shall be construed to be a · part of this 
transaction unless incorporated in writing here-
in. It is further agreed that the execution of 
final transfer papers abrogate this Earnest 
:L\Ioney Receipt.'' 
The execution of this latter instrument constituted the 
agreement of the parties to a written contract for the 
sale and purchase of the property described therein, 
and under its own terms there is no other agreement 
with reference to said property. Now, when the plain-
tiffs allege that t·he parties entered into a different con-
tract, it is barred by the statute of frauds because 
there· is no written memorandum of it signed by the 
parties. The Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, 
although written, by its own terms was abrogated by 
the execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
If Cathrine Jensen, the deceased, ever agreed to sell 
the 251f2 foot tract to the plaintiffs, there is no written 
memorandum of such agreement and under Section 33-
5-3, Utah ·Code Annotated 1943, neither she nor her 
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personal representative could be bound by said agree-
ment. The section reads as follows : 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandurn 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
To seek reformation of an executory contract for 
additional property is no different from seeking to 
bind a person to an alleged oral contract of which 
there is no written memorandum. Professor Williston 
in his work on Contracts, Revised Edition, says at 
Page 4356, Section 1555: 
Even where an executory contract relates to 
land and is within the Statute of Frauds, many 
American authorities allow its reformation 
whether a deed has subsequently been executed 
in conformity with the written contract or not. 
This result deserves support where the instru-
ment contains all the terms required to comply 
with the Statute, but one or more of those essen-
tial terms are by mistake incorrectly stated. 
Some courts, however, have gone further and 
reformed an incomplete instrument so as to 
conform it to the intention of the parties al-
though the omitted terms were necessary to 
comply with the Statute of Frauds. In other 
decisions, however, American courts have de-
clined to reform such an executory contract, 
especially if it is sought to enlarge the tern1s 
of the writing, unless there has. been such ~part 
performance or other circumstances as will make 
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a failure to reform \York a fraud upon the com-
plainant. The theory of the latter cases seems 
sound, and the Restatement of Contracts adopts 
it. \V.here ·the only effect of a refusal to reform 
a contract is the loss of an executory bargai.n 
\Yhich the parties intended to make, it seems 
in1possible to give relief on any principle that 
would not justify the entire destruction of the 
Statute. 
It is submitted that under the rule as adopted by the 
Restatement of Contracts, the reformation granted in 
this case is error because it enlarges the terms of the 
contract by extending the description of the property 
involved to include an entirely separate tract 251h 
feet in width. 
What good is the Statute of Frauds if it doesn't 
prev-ent the possibility of fraud in the offering of testi-
mony concerning an oral contract for the sale of land~ 
Here is a contract complete and clear on its face. The 
purpose of the statute is to prevent a party or a wit-
ness from coming into court and making misrepresen-
tations in trying to set up an oral contract wJlich the 
party to be ch·arged denies~ What protection is there 
for innocent parties from such fraud if the Statute 
of Frauds does not cover this kind_ of case~ And as 
Williston says we might as '"'ell get rid of the statute 
as to whittle down its effect to a point where it offers 
no protection at all. 
IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE 
WITNE·SS, DO·WELL, TO TESTIFY TO CONVER-
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SATIONS AND· NEGOTIATIONS WITH CATHRINE 
JENSEN IN VIOL·ATION OF SECTION 104-49-2 (3), 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943. 
At common law parties to an action or persons in-
terested in the event thereof were disqualified to testify 
on the ground that their interest in the matter tempted 
them to perjure ~hemselves. This rule in most jurisdic-
tions both in England and in America has been eli-
minated by statute· and parties in interest are now 
competent witnesses. Practically every jurisdiction, 
however, made . an exception, and retained the rule in 
the case of a witness who is called to testify ag·ainst 
the heirs, devisees or legal representatives of persons 
deceased as to conversations, negotiations, or trans-
actions with the deceased. Utah's statute is as follows: 
Section 104-49-2, Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
The following persons cannot be witnesses : 
* * * * * 
(3) A party to any civil action, suit or 
proceeding, and any person directly interested 
in the event thereof, and any person from, 
through or under whom such party or interested 
person derives his interest or title or any ·part 
thereof, when the adverse p·arty in such action, 
suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or 
defends, as guardian of an insane or incompetent 
person, or as the executor or administrator, hei1:, 
leg a tee or devisee of any deceased person, or as 
guardian, assignee or grantee, directly or re-
motely, of such heir, legatee or devisee, as to any 
statement by, or transaction with, such deceased, 
insane or incompetent person, or rna tter of fact 
whatever, which must have been equally within 
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the kno\Yledge of both the \vitness and such in-
sane, incon1petent or deceased person, unless such 
·w·itness is called to testify thereto by such ad-
verse party so claiming or opposing, suing or de-
fending, in such action, suit- or proceeding. 
There is a split of authority on the question as to 
whether or not the statute applies to the testimony of 
an agent for the party \vho sues the deceased's repre-
sentatiYe. The Utah court has never ruled on the 
matter. ~Ir. Justice ''rolfe discussed the question in 
an article printed in the Utah Bar Bulletin, July-Aug-
ust, 1941, and 13 Rocky Mountain Law Review 282, 
June, 1941. In pointing out the type of proceeding in. 
which the disqualification exists, he gives a rule that 
it seems ought to apply in cases where agents are 
called to testify. ·It is as follows: 
"A rule of thumb which may not be of uni-
Yersal application but which is at least helpful 
is as follo,vs: On one side is a person who is 
seeking to protect the integrity of the estate or 
to recover assets claimed to belong to it ; on the 
other side is a person who seeks to subtract from 
the estate or resist recovery of claimed assets. 
The statute is for the benefit of the first side 
and operates against the opposing party. There-
fore when one-- stands on the state, affirms and 
acknowledges it for the support of his interest 
or claim whether that interest be derived directly 
or through heirs or others who took or claimed 
through the estate he can take advantage of the 
statute. But he whose claim depends upon sub-
tracting from an estate or on establishing the 
fact that the property did not belong to or was 
not derived from the estate is made incompetent 
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by the statute. Where parties all stand on the 
estate for their rights but the controversy is 
over their respective shares, as in will contests, 
the statute does not apply.'' 
We certainly have a case here where the personal 
representative is defending to preserve the estate from 
depletion by strangers to the estate. A general rule of 
agency is that when an agent acts he acts for his prin-
cipal. The plaintiffs who are attempting to deplete the 
estate were represented by their agent, Dowell, in any 
conversations, negotiations and transactions with the 
deceased. Applying the rule of agency his transactions 
with the deceased were the plaintiffs' transactions with 
the deceased, and his testimony concerning those trans-
actions by the same token was as though it was the tes-
timony of the plaintiffs. The case of Banking House 
of Wilcoxson and Co. vs. Rood ( 1896), 132 Mo. 256, 33 
S. W. 816, supports this · theory. The plaintiff bank 
sued the administratrix of the estate of the maker of 
a ·note payable to the hank. The cashier and president 
of the bank; both of whom were stockholders of the 
bank, were allowed to testify to the genuineness of the 
signature as well as to the fact that they saw the de-
ceased sign the note. It was held that testimony con-
cerning the signing of the note was concerning a nego-
tiation or transaction, ~and "\Vas improperly admitted. 
The court said : 
''Signing the note by deceased was part of 
the transaction which resulted in the contract in 
issue, and the agent of the corporation who con-
ducted the negotiations, 'vhether a stockholder or 
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not, could no n1ore testify to that fact than any 
other fact connected "\Yith the negotiations .... 
The court has ever undertaken to conform its 
decisions to the spirit, rather than to the strict 
letter of this statute. . . . The primary object 
and purpose of the law, evidently, vvas to remove 
the disabilities by vYhich parties to the record 
and parties interested were at common law 
-rendered incom·petent to testify. The exception 
was intended to :prevent the injustice that would 
arise in permitting one party to the contract or 
cause of action to testify when the lips of the 
other are sealed in death.'' 
The exception to the Missouri statute in this case "\Va8 
as follows: 
provided, that in actions where one of the 
· original parties to the contract or cause of action 
in issue and on trial is dead . . . . the other 
_party to such contract or cause of action shall 
not be admitted to testify. 
and the court said : 
A party to the contract has been construed 
to mean the person who negotiated the contract 
rather than the person in whose name and in-
terest it was made. · 
Another case holding that an agent is included with-
in the rule and which follows the Banking House case 
is Taylor vs. George, (1914), 176 Mo. App. -215, 161 S. 
W. 1187, in which the plaintiff sued the executor of her 
mother's estate on ,a claim that prior to her mother's 
death she had rendered care and services under a con-
tract "'Thereby the mother was to pay for said care and 
services. The plaintiff's husband, contending to be an 
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agent of his wife, was held to be incompetent as a wit-
ness inasmuch ~a.s he acted as an agent in negotiating 
the contract with his wife's mother. The court in this 
case said the following: 
. . The present ruling certainly conforms to 
the evident purpose of the statute, makes it 
uniform in its application, and aids in preventing 
inequality and false swearing in that, in all cases 
·w·here one of the active parties in making a 
contract or conducting a business transaction, 
whether as principal or agent, is dead and such 
contract or transaction becomes the basis of a 
lawsuit, then the other active party is disqual-
ified as a witness with relation thereto. Keeping 
this intent and purpose of the proviso to the 
, statute in view, much of the difficulty i-n the 
construction of the statute vanishes by applying 
these principles: That the spirit of the statute 
includes in the term ''party to the contract or 
cause of action" the agent who negotiated the 
contract or conducted the business; that the sta-
tute makes no distinction in this respect between 
corporations or partnerships and individuals 
when acting by agent, and there is no distinction 
in principle; that the proviso to the statute 
makes the death of the other party to a contract 
or cause of action the sole ground and test of 
such disability without any reference to the 
witness' interest in the controversy or his com-
petency at common law. We therefore hold that 
the trial court did -not err in holding that plain-
tiff's husband is not a competent witness as to 
making any contract as agent of his wife with 
the deceased and in excluding his evidence as to 
such matter. 
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It is submitted that the san1e reasons that promp.t-
ed the :3lissouri court to hold the agent incompetent in 
these cases and the same reasons that prompted the 
legislature to disqualify a party in this state are 
present in this case and that Dowell as the agent of 
the plaintiffs in negotiating for the purchase of the 
real estate from Cathrine Jensen, ought to have been 
disqualified from testifying to those transactions after 
the lips of Cathrine Jensen had been sealed by death. 
The spirit as \Yell as the letter of the law \Yould then 
be served. 
Not only should Do\vell be disqualified as an agent 
of the plaintiffs, but he should also have been held 
incompetent as a person interested in the event of the 
suit. In referring to the transcr~pt where· defendant's 
counsel cross examined Mr. Dowell we find at T. 15:3 
the following: 
Q. Now you, as I understand, still have a 
note of Mr. Sine's which has not been paid, for 
the payment of your commission~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And your instructions were to, you say, 
to buy the en tire tract~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. So that if Mr. Sine is not successful in 
·this lawsuit you may not be able to collect your 
commission~ 
(An objection was here made \vhich was 
overruled.) 
A. There was never any question in my 
mind about collecting that. 
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Q. But you are interested 1n see1ng that 
Mr. Sine prevails in this action~ 
A. Definitely, I feel that I fell down on it, 
on my end. 
Ap·pellant contends that the interest Mr. Dowell 
admits in the action is such a direct interest in the 
event thereof as to disqualify him. The best way to 
determine if a person should be disqualified because 
of interest is to go to the common law and see if, 
before the statutes liberalizing the rules of competency, 
an agent would have been disqualified because of a 
similar interest in a suit. Jones, Commentaries on Evi- · 
dence, 2nd Ed., Vol. 5, Page 4280, also advocates this 
guide as follows : 
''Sec. 2235-Persons Interested in Suit-In 
General-In many jurisdictions the disqualifying 
proviso extends to persons generally who are 
'in teres ted in the event' of the particular ac-
tion in which they seek to testify, whether or 
not they are parties to the action or to a par-
ticular contract in issue. In view of the number 
of statutes in which such language is employed, 
it becomes necessary to determine the nature of 
interest sufficient to bring a proposed witness 
within the term. We may say at the outset that 
in no event does disqualification for interest 
under such provisos go beyond the common law 
conception of that term as developed around the 
rule prior to comparatively modern statutes that 
a party or person '-interested' was incompetent 
as a witness in any suit or action. It is con-
ceived that the intent of the provisos in such 
statutes could only have been to save the common 
law rule in the exceptions stated, and not to 
go beyond such rule.'' 
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The comn1on la"r rule that disqualified all parties 
and all persons interested in the event of the suit was 
rather harsh in the case of transactions in which par-
ties usually dealt through agents, brokers and factors, 
for there 'Yas no "~a-y of proving the existence of, or 
details of, such transactions unless they were permitted 
to call their agents, brokers and factors to testify for 
them. So out of public necessity and convenience grew 
an exception to the interest rule and such individuals 
"~ere allowed to testify. But this exception was limited 
to cases 'vhere the agent had acted within the ordinary 
course of the business of his principal, and where he 
had no direct interest in the suit. Greenleaf in his 
work on Eviden~e, 14th Ed. Vol. 1, page 503, dis-
cusses the question as follows: 
"Sec. 417-Limitations of Exception in Favor 
of Agents, Etc. - This exception being thus 
founded upon considerations of public_ necessity 
and convenience, for the sake of trade and the 
common usage of business, it is manifest, that it 
cannot be .extended to cases where the witness is 
called to testify to facts out of the usual and 
ordinary course of business, . or to contradict or 
deny the effect of those acts which he has done 
as agent. He is safely admitted, in all cases, to 
prove that he acted according to the directions 
of his principal and within the scope of his duty; 
·both on the ground of necessity, and because 
the principal can never maintain an action 
against him for any act done according to his 
own directions, whatever may be the result of 
the suit in which he is called as a ''Titness. But 
if the cause depends on the question, whether 
the agent has been guilty of some tortious act, 
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or some negligence in the course of executing 
the orders of his p~rincipal, and in respect of 
which he would be liable over to the principal, if 
the latter should fail in the action pending 
against him, the agent, as we have seen, is not 
a competent witness for his principal, without 
a release. '' 
and here Mr. Greenleaf cites the case of Fuller vs. 
Wheelock, 10 Pick. 135, an old Massachusetts case de-
cided in the days before the relaxation of the compe-
tency rules. The p~laintiff brought an action on a 
promissory note, and the defendant pleaded payment 
to the plaintiff's agent. The plaintiff was allowed to 
put on his agent who testified that even though he made 
out a receipt to the defendant, he didn't receive the 
payment. The court held that admission of this testi-
mony was error because of the incompetency of the 
witness. A part of the decision of the court is as fol-
lows: 
''The question then is, was this witness in-
competent by reason of interest, and the court 
are of opinion that he was. He was the ackno,:rl-
edged agent of the plaintiff to receive the money; 
his receipt was prima facie evidence that he had 
received it, and the plaintiff had given him no 
release. If the plaintiff failed in this suit, he 
would have an immediate action against the 
witness for money had and received; an action 
which a recovery in this suit. would bar. If the 
plaintiff should prevail in thi~ suit, the defend-
ant would have no action over against the wit-
ness, to recover back the money, without being 
obliged to p~rove not only that he had paid the 
money according to the terms of the receipt, but 
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also that the ".,.itness had been g'uilty of son1e 
brearh of trust, to,Yards the party of 'vhom the 
money " ... as rereived, so as to bring the case 
'Yithin the principle of Fow'ler v. Shearer, 7 
~lass. 23. Otherwise, the 'vitness being duly 
authorized to receive the money, would be re-
sponsible to his prinripal only, and not to the 
defendant. ,, ... e think, therefore, that his direct 
interest on one side, was not balanced by an 
equal interest on other side, and that he was 
not· a competent witness. 
''X or does the " ... itness come within the ex-
ception in regard to agents. This exception is 
founded upon considerations of necessity and 
great public convenience, for the sake of trade, 
and the common usage of business. These cou-
siderations, cannot apply where a witness is 
called to testify to facts out of the usual and 
common course ~f business, and to contradict 
and deny the effect of those acts which he appears 
to have done as such agent." 
At 70 Corpus Juris 266 the rule, as supported by 
possibly the \Yeight of authority, that allows an agent 
to testify· is stated and then qualified to include Green-
leaf's limitation as follows: 
''Sec. 333-Agent of Party-One who acted 
as an agent for another in a transaction with a 
person since deceased is, as a general rule, com-
petent to testify as to transactions or communi--
cations with decedent. An agent, being neither a 
party to, nor directly interested in, the result 
of an action by or against his principal or a 
representative of his deceased principal, is com-
petent as a witness therein. However, where the 
agency is coupled with an interest in the event 
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of· the action, the agent will be disqualified as a 
witness.'' 
Corpus Juris cites in support of this last sentence the 
above quotation from Greenleaf, and the case of Bruner 
vs. Battell's Executors, 83 Ill. 317. The Illinois case 
involved the question of the last installment payment 
on a real estate contract, and was being prosecuted by 
the purchaser's personal representative. Following the 
Fuller vs. Wheelock, supra, case the court held that 
the seller's agent should not have been allowed to testi-
fy as t~ non-payment. The court said that prior to the 
Statute of 1867 which removed the disqualification of 
parties and those interested in the event of the suit, 
there would have been no question as to the incompe-
tency of the agent's testimony and further that ''the 
act of 1867 -would have removed the disability of the 
agent by reason of his interest,. had he testified while 
Bruner was living; but when he testified Bruner 'vas 
dead, the suit was being prosecuted by his widow and 
heirs, and the matter of his evidence comes within 
none of the exceptions in that statute, which allows au 
interested party to testify, notwithstanding the suit is 
being _prosecuted by the representatives of a deceased 
person, on the theory that the mouth of the deceased 
had been closed by death.'' 
Dowell admitted as shown above- that he felt that 
he had let Mr. Sine down in negligently transacting the 
bu~iness it is alleged he had been employed to perform. 
Why shouldn't Mr. Sine, if he instructed Dowell to 
purchase both tracts, seek retribution from Dowell for 
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his neglig-ence·? Of course, he ean 't sue Dowell for 
specific performance, but he could sue for damages for 
the loss of the bargain it is alleged he thought he was 
getting. Dowell kne\Y there was the possibility of such 
a suit and therefore it is possible he was tempted to 
testify as he did, in trying to set up this mutual mis-
take~ for as the court in the Fuller vs. Wheelock case, 
supra, said 4 'if the plaintiff failed in this suit, he would 
have an immediate action against the witness . . . an 
action \Yhich a recovery in this suit would bar.'' Of 
course, the appearance of the plaintiffs and the wit-
ness Dowell in court was that they were very friendly. 
and that the plaintiffs had no ill teeling toward Dowell 
for his negligence i~ the closing of the transaction. 
Nevertheless it is submittede that if the plaintiffs should 
eventually lose this ease on appeal they might well 
proceed against Mr. Dowell, and there is authority that 
they would have a good cause of action. The Restate-
ment of Agency, Section 379 provides as follows : 
Unless otherwise agreed a paid agent is sub-
ject to a duty to the principal to act with stand-
ard care and with the skill which is standard 
in the locality for the kind of work which he 
is employed to perform and, in addition, to ex-
ercise any special skill that he has. 
The fact that the plaintiffs were negligent themselve~ 
in not carefully reading the contr·act, as prepared by 
Mr. Dowell, if such fact is true, would be no defense 
for Mr. Dowell in the event of suit against him by 
plaintiffs for his negligence in representing them. An 
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example of this is the case of Shapiro vs. Amalgamated 
Trust and Savings Bank, 283 Ill. App. 243. In this 
case the plaintiff had instructed her bank to obtain a 
fire insurance policy on some property of hers. The 
bank purch,ased a policy which carried a condition as 
follows: "Void if the interest of the insured be other 
than unconditional and sole ownership.'' The officers 
of the bank who handled the transaction for her knew 
that her ownership was not sole and unconditional. 
When plaintiff's p·remises were destroyed by fire and 
the insurance company refused to reimburse for the 
fire damage because of the condition, plaintiff brought 
~an action for neglig~nce against the bank and its de-
fense was that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
for not reading the policy ~erself. The Court held for 
the plaintiff, and in its decision said the following: 
''In the instant case the defendant was the 
agent of the plaintiffs in procuring the insurance 
policy and it cannot avoid liability because of 
an alleged failure on the part of the plaintiff 
to ascertain whether the agent has faithfully 
performed the duty for which it was employed." 
·rn recapitulation of the points of this argument 
the court should note, first, that the agent, Dowell, was 
negligent in not purchasing for his clients the 25¥2 
foot tract, if his instructions were in fact to so pur-
chase it; second, that the plaintiffs' failure to read the 
contract carefully would be no bar to an action by said 
plaintiffs against Dowell for his negligence; third, that 
if plaintiffs succeed in this lawsuit they will, of course 
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be barred against suing Do,Yell, or conversely, if they 
do not succeed, they Inight well bring an action ~against 
Dow·ell; fourth, that such possibility of suit gives 
Do,vell a direct interest in the outcome of the present 
action, and such interest, under our statute, is suffi-
,. cient to disqualify him as a witness against the ·de-
fendant. 
v. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF 
REFOR)IA.TION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF A MUTUAL 
MISTAKE IN THE EXE·CUTION OF THE UNI-
FOR}I REAL ESTATE CO·NTRA·CT. 
To secure reformation of a written contract which 
is presumed to be the real contract and to contain all 
the terms agreed upon, the party seeking relief and 
demanding reformation of the contract must establish 
the mutual mistake by evidence that is clear, satis-
factory and convincing. This rule was early est~ab­
lished in Utah as indicated in the following cases: 
Cram vs. Reynolds, (1919) 55 Utah 384, 186 Pac. 100; 
Wherritt vs. Dennis, 48 Utah 309, 159 Pac. 534; Weight 
vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 Pac. 899; Deseret National 
Bank vs. Dinwoodey et al., 17 Utah 43, 53 Pac. 215; 
Ewing vs. Keith, 16 Utah 312, 53 Pac. 4; Chambers 
vs. Emery, 13 Utah 374. Whether it is the alleged mis-
take made by the plaintiff who is attempting to show 
a different contract from that which is written, or 
whether it is the alleged mistake of the defendant who 
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is insisting that he made no mistake, the evidence to 
est~ablish the mistake of either must be clear, sati~­
factory- and convincing. 
In order to determine whether or not there is any 
clear and convincing evidence that Cathrine Jensen 
ever intended to sell the 25¥2 foot tract together with 
the 49¥2 foot tract to the plaintiffs, or that she did in 
fact agree to sell the 25y2 foot tract, as alleged by 
plaintiffs, we rriust make a careful e~amination of the 
evidence. In that connection there follows all of the 
evidence that has any bearing on the alleged fact that 
she had such intention or so agreed; and it must be 
noted that it is all Mr. Dowell's testimony, for both 
the plaintiffs, Jerry and Dor~a Sine, testified that they 
had no contact with Cathrine Jensen, personally, be-
fore, or at the time of, the execution of the contract. 
T. 46, and T. 58. 
The following testimony of Mr. Dowell was ad-
mitted over -the objection of defendant's counsel (T. 
70): 
Q. Did you talk to Mrs. Jensen concerning 
this property~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many times~ 
MR. MACFARLANE: Now my objection goes 
to this whole line of testimony, if Your Honor 
please. 
THE CouRT: Yes, that is the understanding. 
A. Well, I called on Mrs. Jensen twice at 
her home on Eighth South and at least three 
tiines at her home on Third South. 
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Q. How many of those conversations were 
prior to the execution of these contracts, prior 
to the execution of Exhibit D, the Uniform Real 
Estate contract 1 
A. ''Tell, it would be two on Eighth South 
prior to the time I drew· up this contract because 
,,,.e hadn't reached a meeting of the minds on 
the purchase price and terms. 
Q. No\Y on your first approach to Mrs. 
Jensen, state where and \Yhen that took place. 
A. "Vv~ell, that was in her home on Eighth 
South. As a matter of fact, it was termed her· 
husband's home. It belonged to Mr. Jensen, as 
I understand it. At any rate she was there 
"~hen I rang the bell or knocked. 
MR. MACFARLANE: Now I want the further 
objection, if Y-our Honor please and the record 
to show that the negotiations of the parties 
later resulted in a written agreement and that 
all of the conversations and negotiations were 
merged in a written agreement and this con-
versation is incompetent, ·- irrevelant and im-
material. 
THE CouRT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. Will you proceed 1 
A. Mrs. Jensen, I learned after, asked me 
to come 1n. The door, the screen door was 
locked. Her daughter from Colorado at that 
time was there and opened the door. I said to 
Mrs. Jensen, ''My name is Dowell. I am a real 
estate agent. I understand you own some prop-
erty on West North Temple adjoining the 
Bishop's Auto Court~" She said, "That is 
right." I said, "Is it for sale~" She said, "Yes, 
I'll sell it." I said, "What would you ask for 
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it1 What would you take, including the commis-
sion 1" She said, "I want $8,500.00." I said, "I 
can't get $8,500.00. I can get you $8,000.00. I 
am authorized to buy it for $8,000.00.'' She 
said, "who wants to buy it 1" At first I was 
reluctant to say it. I was thinking in my own 
mind if I went down there-
( Objection-Sustained.) 
· A. She asked who wanted to buy it. I said, 
"The man who owns the auto court next to it, 
Mr. Sine.'' She said, ''He should pay more for 
it." I said, "$8,000.00 is all he wants to pay 
for it and in my opinion that is a lot of money 
for it.'' She talked about a lot of things. Her 
daughter came in and we talked about everything 
but real estate. We agreed-
( Objection-Overruled.) 
A. The conversation involved the $8,500.00. 
If I could get Mr. Sine to pay $8,500.00 with 
$1,500.00 down and $75.00 a month she vvould 
accept it. I went back to Mr. Sine and asked, 
told him what I had found out. 
* * * * * 
(T. 73) 
Q. Then you went back to Mrs.· Jensen~ 
A. I didn't go back to Mrs. Jensen that 
day. I went back the following day. 
Q. Where did you see her then 1 
A. At the place I met her previously. 
Q. Who was present at that time1 
A. Mrs. Jensen, as I recall, was there. 
Her daughter was just driving away. In fact, 
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her daughter "~as preparing to go back to Col-
orado, as I recall. 
Q. Will you state "\Yhat the conversation 
"\Yas on that occasion~ 
A. I said, ''Sine still wants to buy it for 
$1,000.00 and he will pay $75.00 a month for 
t"\YO years.'' She said, ''I'm not going to pay 
a commission out of $1,000.00. It doesn't give 
me any money.'' I said, ''As a matter of fact, 
I am g·oing to lend Sine the commission. You 
agreed to take $8,000.00 net. Sine is paying the 
commission.'' And then that is when I had this 
agreement and she signed it. 
Q. Now h-ad Sine already signed this Ex-
hibit? 
A. Yes. When Sine first-
THE CouRT: That is the earnest money re-
ceipt you are talking about now~ 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. Exhibit c~ 
A. You see I didn't have an earnest money 
receipt when Sine first talked to me about it. 
(Objection-Overruled.) 
Q. Well, have you -related all of those con-
versations~ 
A. You mean up to this time the earnest 
money receipt was signed~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. Generally everything, as I recall, that 
has been said. 
Q. Was anything said other than what you 
have testified to concerning the identity of the 
property or description of it~ 
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A. There was nothing said other than talk-
ing about the property. 
(Objection interposed here. Overruled.) 
A. That was all that was said. I said, ''The 
property that adjoins the Bishop's Auto Court." 
Q. Was there any conversation regarding 
dimensions' 
A. Yes. 
MR. MACFARLANE: I object to that as leading 
and suggestive. 
THE CouRT: The objection is overruled. 
A. There was talk about the dimensions 
when we were talking about this price. 1\tfy 
opinion was it was a lot of money for a house 
forty years old. I said, ''If you figure this out-
the house isn't worth very much money-this 
man is paying $8,000.00 for a-
Q. Give your conversation. 
A. She said, ''I get eighty or ninety dollarH 
a month income from that and I could get a lot 
more if rent controls were taken off." I said, 
''The fact remains you are getting more than 
$100.00 a foot for it. This· buyer is going to 
tear the house down anyway.'' She said, ''That 
has nothing to do with me. He is crazy if he 
is going to tear it down.'' I knew the piece down 
the street-
MR. MACFARLANE: I object to what he kne,v, 
Your Honor~ 
Q. State what you told her. 
A. I told her a piece down th~ street sold 
for $85 a foot. 
Q. Do you know whether the matters you 
have just related were in the first or second con-
versation~ 
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A. Well, they· were both in the second con-
versation. I am inclined to think they were in 
the second conversation. The first time it was 
even more conversation and I didn't know what 
Sine would say so I couldn't sign up anything 
definitely, "'"hether he wanted to pay $8,500.00 
or not, so I couldn't say anything definitely. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF DOWELL (T. 148) 
BY ~lR. BIRD: 
Q. N O\Y, Mr. Dowell, you stated last eve-
ning out of Court to me that there was some 
additional conversation that you had with Mrs. 
Jensen prior to the execution of the earnest 
money receipt in this case which you didn't 
mention and had not volunteered, is that correct 1 
A. That's right. 
Q. Will you state what that was~ 
* * * * * 
MR. MACFARLANE: Now may I have the same 
objection that I have been· interposing-that this 
is an incompetent witness and ·this is hearsay: 
THE CouRT: Yes you may, and the objection 
will be overruled. 
A. In the conversation, trying to . prevail 
upon Mrs. Jensen, trying to get her to accept 
$8,000.00 for the property, I said, ''Of course 
this property is worth- more to· my client than 
anyone else. That is the main reason he is pay-
ing $8,000.00. The main reason is to straighten 
this out.'' I said, "However, he has in mind 
building a cafe there. People staying in this 
court have objected to having to go so far. They 
would stay one night and the next day they 
would move on account of having to go so far 
to get satisfactory food. Sine says I believe I 
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could vut up a restaurant there and not only 
make it pay me-
THE CouRT: This is what Mr. Sine said to 
you~ 
Q. This is in your conversation with Mrs. 
Jensen~ 
THE CouRT: Oh, you told Mrs. Jensen that~ 
A. Yes. 
THE CouRT: All right. 
A. ''Sine had told me he aimed to put up 
a restaurant for the reason it would not only be 
p~rofitable to him but it would add to the value 
of his auto court, the operation of it. It would 
be a more complete operation.'' And Mrs. J en-
sen said, ''Well, I have had in mind doing some-
thing of that nature myself, if my health per-
mitted or if I had somebody to entrust it to 
whom I could rely upon. I still might do that.'' 
She reluctantly-
MR. MACFARLANE: I move that "reluctantly" 
be stricken. 
THE CouRT: Well, that part, that word will 
go out. Just don ~t use the word ''reluctantly.'' 
Q. Describe what she said and did and if 
you can make plain her attitude. Otherwise you 
must not _say what was in her mind. You say 
what she said and did. 
A. She said, ''I would hold on to the prop-
erty. The children don't want me to sell it. But 
I am glad to be free of it for the reason that 
I just can't take care of it.'' She had a grand-
daughter living in the property-
MR. MAcFARLA:NE: Now did she say that~ 
A. Yes. She told me her granddaughter 
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"\Yas there .. I could have found her w'ithout going 
to all of the trouble to locate her. But of course 
at the time I didn't kno'v that her granddaughter 
lived there. 
Q. Have you completed the conversation~ 
A. Yes. 
Except for some references to Mrs. Jensen in 
connection 'vith obtaining the abstract from her and 
haYing her sign an affidavit ~and the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract itself, the above is the complete testi-
mony of Mr. Dowell "\vith respect to any conversations 
he had "\Yith Cathrine Jensen from which there is any 
indication of what was on her mind, when she entered 
into this contract, concerning the amount of ground 
she intended to sell. And among_ all these statements 
only three provide ~any inference at all that Catherine 
Jensen might have thought that the contract was for-
the 25¥2 foot tract as- well as for the 491f2 foot tract. 
Twice Dowell referred to the property Sine wanted to 
purchase as the property adjoining the Bishop's Auto 
Court, T. 72 and T. 75, and once at T. 149 and T. 150 
the conversation concerned Sine's desire to put up a 
restaurant or eafe there. Regarding this restaurant 
or cafe, there is nothing to show that Cathrine Jensen 
might not have thought that Sine's desire was to put 
up the cafe or restaurant on the 49lf2 foot piece, on 
the corner, because Dowell had previously told her 
that if Sine purchased the property he would tear 
down the duplex on it (T. 76). Therefore, it is not 
unreasonable to believe that Cathrine Jensen didn't 
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realize that Dowell was bargaining for the 25¥2 foot 
piece as well. 
As against this incompetent evidence concerning 
these conversations there is the testimony of all of the 
Defendant's witnesses, including herself, that Cathrine 
Jensen, at some time either just before or soon after 
she executed the Uniform Real Estate Contract, had 
told them she had plans for the use of the 25¥2 foot 
piece of ground. The defendant, Mrs. Harper, and a 
daughter of Mrs. Jensen, testified at T. 110 and 111 
as follows: 
Q. Now were there any other conversations 
at which you were present in which the twenty-
five-and-a-half-foot strip was discussed? 
A. Well, .a long time before that. 
Q. When would a long time before be~ 
A. That was in the fall of 1947. 
Q. And who was p·resent at this conversa-
tion? 
A. Well, niy father and Mrs. Freeman and 
she-
MR. BIRD: Could we have the date of that 
and the place? 
A. Well, it was about September of 1947. 
* * * * * 
Q. Now will you relate that conversation, 
please~ 
(Objection-Overruled.) 
A. At that time she wanted my father to 
build him a little lunchstand, hamburger place, 
-you know. Something along that order, thought 
it would give him a small income for his live-
lihood. 
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The following testimony at ~. 126, 127 was given 
by Mrs. Freeman, another daug·hter of Cathrine Jensen: 
Q. Now, 1\lrs. Freeman, did you in the year 
1947 discuss \Yith your mother, or was the matter 
discussed in your presence about this twenty-
five-and-a-half-foot strip after the sale of the 
forty-nine-and-a-half-foot strip to Mr. Sine~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And when was that, please~ 
A. That was right, I talked "ri th her right 
after she had sold the place. 
* * * * * 
A. Mother said I could go ahead and use 
the twenty- five- and- a- half- foot piece and my 
father could build us a little hamburger place 
and little lunchstand and she thought he was a 
good cook and he could cook and I could help 
him. She said that would be adequate, it would 
be plenty large for a little five-cent place and 
since there was tourist cabins around there and 
she thought that would be a nice place and I 
mentioned that to Mrs. Sine.'' 
And then at T. 128 she further testified to the same 
conversation in September, 1947, as Mrs. Harper tes-
tified to. 
Mr. Biddinger, the father of Mrs. Harper and ~rs. 
Freeman, from whom Mrs. Jensen had been divorced 
in 1937, testified at T. 134 to the conversation in Sep-
tember, 1947 referred to _above, and further at T. 135 
that he had a conversation with Cathrine Jensen in 
June, 1948, at which time she told him she wanted hhu 
to take this 25lf2 foot piece of property and build a 
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little house on it, beoause he was then living in a base. 
ment apartment and was getting rheumatism. 
Mr. J. C. Jensen, the deceased's surviving husband, 
tes~tified at T. 140 to the same general line of conver-
sations, although he did not place any one of them at 
any particular time. 
Another daughter of Cathrine Jensen, named Ver-
da Wheeler, testified at T. 165, 166 that the day her 
mother signed the Earnest Money Receipt ~nd Agree-
ment, the day of Dowell's second visit, she and her 
mother went to the premises at 656-658 West North 
Temple, and had the following conversation: 
A. Well mother, she said, ''They are not 
buying all of this. '' She said, '' They are buying 
this that the house is on'' and showed me what 
it was and I asked her why she wasn't selling 
the other twenty-five feet and she said, "I didn't 
buy that with the place and I am not selling it 
with the place." She said -she wanted to put a 
hamburger stand some place on it and she said, 
''I am not selling the place.'' 
Mrs. Wheeler further testified at T. 166 as follows: 
Q~ Now during the conversation that you 
heard on the first occasion did you ever hear 
Mr. Dowell mention seventy-five-foot frontage~ 
A. No sir, I don't remember hearing any 
footage mentioned at all. As I remember it, it 
was numbers ~656 and 658. 
Q. And did you during that conversation 
hear a statement in substance and effect made 
by Mr. Dowell that at $8,000.00 she would be 
getting more than $100.00 a foot~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
51 
.A.. X o sir, I don't remember $8,000.00 be-
ing mentioned. 
Q. Did you on that occasion, the first occa-
sion, ever hear the name of Mr. Do,vell 's client 
or the prospective purchaser mentioned~ 
A. No sir. Not until mother and I went 
up to the house. The day we went up to the 
house she told me \Yho was buying it. 
Q. Well, that was the second time~ 
A. The second time, yes sir. 
The existence of the written Uniform Real Estate 
Contract requires that plaintiffs' evidence of mistake be 
clear and convincing. In the light of all of the above 
evidence, Dowell's testimony is certainly not clear and 
convincing. He stands alone as the only person who 
has given any evidence of Cathrine Jensen's alleged 
mistake. Even the court at T. 99, after hearing Dowell's 
testimony concerning his two visits to Cathrine Jensen, 
said there was no proof as to when she learned about 
the ·fact that the con tract did not include the 25¥2 
foot piece. It is admitted that she knew about it on 
the 24th day o£ November, 1947 when she paid the 
taxes on it. There being no proof according to the 
court as to when she learned of it prior to that timf~, 
there is no ~proof that she didn't know all the time just 
exactly what the description in the contract covered. 
Of course, as shown above, plaintiffs have attempted 
to prove by Dowell's testimony of conversations with 
Cathrine Jensen that she intended and agreed to sell 
the 25¥2 foot piece, but not one word of it refers to 
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any statement by her that she intended to sell the 251;2 
foot tract. 
Following a long line of Utah cases the court in 
the case of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 
206, upheld the lower court's refusal to reform a con-
t:vact for the sale of land, the default on which was 
the basis for an action in unlawful detainer. The de-
fendants claimed that the contract failed to express 
the true intent of the parties in that it incorrectly pro-
vided that the mortgage was renewable for an addi-
tional term of three years, instead of for additional 
terms of three years, as intended by the parties and 
that the scrivenor had made the mistake. Both de-
fendants testified that in the ,conversations had prior to 
the making of the contract it was stated that the plain-
tiff would gr~ant them the privilege of renewing this 
mortgage for additional terms. The plaintiff and her 
daughter testified just as positively that it was for one 
additional term. The attorney who drafted the paper 
testified that it was the understanding between the par-
ties that it should be for additional terms and that the 
language in the instrument was probably the result of 
a typographical error of his stenographer. The court 
held that such was not clear and convincing evidence 
of the mistake and denied reformation. 
Cases from a few other jurisdictions might serve 
to show what is intended by the requirement that the 
mutual mistake be proven by cle3:r and convincing evi-
dence. In the case of Biskupski vs. Jaroszewski (1947) 
398 Ill. 287, 7-6 N. E. 2d 55, the appellate court re-
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versed a decree of reformation of a contract for the 
purehase of property described as a corner store kno"\\rn 
as 8450 Commercial Avenue, which the plaintiff claimed 
"~~as intended to include another store next to it known 
as 8448, both of which stores were in the same build-
ing. The holding of the court was in spite of the fol-
lowing evidence in favor of the plaintiff: Plaintiff tes-
-tified that the preliminary negotiations concerned the 
whole "building". The plain tiff's son testified that 
the 'vord "building" \vas used. The plaintiff's son-in-
la'Y -testified to the same effect concerning the nego-
tiations and further that when the defendant took them 
to look at the premises they went back and looked at 
the ''building" from the rear. The real estate agent 
\Yho dre\Y the contract testified that he knew of both 
numbers, and when he asked whether to use both num-
bers in the contract, he was told by the defendants 
that 8450 covered the whole building. The court said 
that this evidence was too loose and there were too 
many discrepancies to overcome the strong presump-
tion arising out of the written contract. 
In the case of 'Teutsch vs. Hvistendahl (1947), _ 
S. D. _, 29 N. W. 2d 389, the seller owned lots 7 and 
8. The house was mostly on lot 7, but overlapped 6.7 
feet onto lot 8. The written contract for the sale of 
the house, prepared by the seller, provided for the 
sale of Lot 7 only. The purchaser upon discovery of 
his error sued for reformation of the contract to in-
clude lot 8. On the ground that there had never been 
any understanding bet,veen the parties prior to the 
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written contract which differed from the intention 
manifested in said contract, the court held that the 
trial court's refusal to reform the contract was correct. 
If there ever existed a set of facts that justified a 
court of equity to reform a deed they were in the Mis-
souri case of Hood vs. Owens (1927), 293 S. W. 774. In 
that case the parents of the ·plaintiffs had owned a four 
acre tract of land upon which stood their home, and two 
town platted lots adjoining the four acre tract across 
which lots was a road giving access to the highway 
which adjoined the town platted lots on the opposite 
side from the four acre tract. The parents had ob-
tained all three parcels in the same deed. This case 
concerns a deed· to the two plaintiffs from their p~r­
ents, reserving a life estate, which deed described only 
the two town platted lots. The complaining daughter 
con tended that the parents had in tended to include all 
three parcels. At the time of executing the deed the 
parents had also executed a will disposing all· of their 
other property to several other children. It carried 
this provision: ''My daughters Nellie Gee and Lena 
Gericke (Plaintiffs ·herein) having already been ·pro-
vided for, I give nothing to them out of my personal 
.property.'' The will disposed of no real property, but 
purported to dispose of all the ,property left. The evi-
dence was to the effect that the deed and will were 
both made at the hank by Judge Hopper. The banker 
who was a witness to the will testified iri part as follows: 
''Judge Hopper had the book and did most 
- of the explaining, and my recollection is that he 
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read it over, the will, and the question was asked 
there ""hy the two girls got nothing, and it was 
explained there that the old folks had deeded 
this fiye acres to them, to these two girls.'' 
A. They brought the "\vill there. The reason 
that he gave· them nothing, they had been paid 
out. They were provided for in the deed. 
Q. To 'vhat~ 
..~..-\.. To that five acres "\vhere they lived, that 
he had "\vhen they lived there, to the five acres. 
* * * * * 
Q. Do you know what land was described 
In the deed~ 
A. No sir, only it "\Vas understood to be 
that five acres. 
Q. Who understood that~ 
A. Judge Hopper and the two ·old folks." 
A Mrs. Della Call testified : 
''I knew where the Gericke home was in 
Miller. They owned four or five acres there. I 
talked to her about this home there at Miller. 
She said it was coming to Lena Hood and Nellie 
Gee at her death. 
Lena Hood testified: 
''Mama had told me, and Papa did too, why 
he hadn't given us anything in his "\vill. Because 
we were to take care of mother as long as she 
lived and of him as long as he lived also, and it 
was to fall to us at her death, the property.'' 
* * * * * 
Q. Did your mother tell you that this deed 
had been made~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
56 
THE CouRT: What did she say about it~ 
A. She told me the next day after Mr. 
Hopper was out there how they had made the 
will, and she had made the deed out and how 
she had made it to us girls. We were to take 
care of her as long as she lived. 
THE CouRT: Had made a deed to what~ 
A. To that property to us girls. 
Q. To what property~ 
A. To the four acres that .we were living 
on. That was all. she h·ad. 
Q. What did she say about what property 
it was that she had made the deed to~ 
A. It was .the four acres, the place we were 
living on. They were to have the right to it as 
long as they lived. . . . '' - · 
An excer~p:t from the decision of the court is as 
follows: 
'' The evidence tends to show that the two 
platted town lots, conveyed to L·ena Hood and 
Nellie Gee by the Warranty Deed which they 
seek to have reformed, have a width of only 
fifteen feet and the area of the two lots is so 
small that no substantial buildings or improve-
ments can be erected thereon, and that the two 
platted lots are practically valueless, unless they 
be used as a part of the four-acre tract of land 
in controversy, immediately adjoining said ·lots 
on the south. The two platted lots lie between 
the four-acre tract and a public road or street 
on the north of said lots. Access to the public 
street from the four-acre tract can be had only 
over and across the two platted lots. The dwell-
ing house and improvements are located entirely 
upon the four-acre tract in controversy. 
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'·But \Yhether the makers of the deed erred 
in their judgment as to the value of the two 
platted lots \Yhich \Yere actually conveyed by the 
deed, or \Yhether they intended to convey by the 
deed the four-acre tract in question, as well as 
the t"~o pia tted lots \vhich \Yere actually conveyed 
by the deed, \Ve find no clear and convincing 
proof in this record of the manifest intention of 
the makers of the deed to have included in the 
deed the four-acre tract of land, which respond-
ents, long after the· deaths of the scrivener and 
makers of the deed, now seek to have inserted 
therein.'' 
"''Thile it may be true that an inference might 
be drawn from the evidence and surrounding 
circumstances herein, which, in the ordinary trial 
of facts, might justify a finding that the grantors 
intended to include in the deed the four-acre 
tract omitted therefrom, yet such inference can-
not be indulged where reformation of an executed 
\Yritten instrument is sought in equity, inasmuch 
as clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of mu-
tual mistake is always required in actions for 
reformation of such an instrument. 
"It follows that the circuit court erred in 
decreeing reformation of the deed from Jennie 
l\1. and Henry J. Gericke to respondents, Lena 
Hood and Nellie Gee, and that the judgment of 
partition, based upon such reformation, is like-
wise erroneous. ' ' 
It might be helpful to . the court to consider two 
or three cases in which a reformation of the written 
instrument has been granted in order to determine 
whether or not there is the necessary clear and con-
vincing evidence in the case at bar. A recent case in 
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California, Good vs. Lindstrom (1947), 80 Cal. App. 
2d 476, 181 Pac. 2d 933, granted reformation of a deed 
which, included 6¥2 acres instead of 1¥2 acres originally 
agreed upon as claimed by the Seller. Plaintiff put in 
evidence a document purporting to be an offer to pur-
chase signed by the defendant, which described the 
property as 1¥2 acres. The court said the evidence 
was convincing. This case is easily distinguishable 
from the case at bar for there is no writing anywhere 
in the case at bar which describes the property as a 
75 foot tract. 
In Whitt ys. Proctor (1947), 305 Ky. 454, 204 S. 
W. 2d 582, there was involved a deed describing only 
three out of. five contiguous lots. The grantees under 
the deed took possession of all five lots believing them 
all to have been conveyed. The grantors even watched 
the grantees tear down a barn and remove peach trees 
on the two lots that were not included in the deed. All 
five lots were later sold by the original grantees men-
. ti'Oned above to subsequent purchasers from them, who 
likewise took possession and used all five lots for 20 
years. The latter discovered the mistake in the original 
purchaser's deed and sued in equity for its reforma-
tion to include the other two lots. The court held the 
evidence to be sufficiently clear and convincing to grant 
reform'ation, especially because the defendant had slept 
on his rights · and led the purchasers to believe that he 
had intended to sell all five lots. 
The plaintiff in Capone vs. Roberts, (1947) 73 N. 
Y. Supp. 2d 712, owned three parcels of land by virtue 
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of one deed. T'vo parcels had houses on them. The 
third did not. The deed in questi'on described all three 
parcels also. Plaintiff, the seller, brings this action in 
equity for reformation of the deed so as to include 
only one parcel in the deed, claiming that the prelimi-
nary negotiations for sale which referred only to 1222 
Dabney .... \.venue ""'"ere intended to cover only the one 
parcel. There "\Yas evidence produced at the trial that 
the seller who couldn't read or speak English well took 
his old deed to his attorney to have the new deed drawn 
up, and the attorney knowing no better, copied the 
same description. Although the defendant testified that 
he thought he was to get all three parcels, his lawyer 
frankly admitted that he was surprised to -learn that 
the description in the deed included more than one 
house. There was further evidence that the parcels 
were fenced separately, and assessed for taxes separ-
ately. A written notice of- change of o'vnership was 
prepared at the time of closing and sent to the- ten-
ants of 1222 Dabney Avenue, but none was sent to 
the tenants of the other house, which the court said 
\vas significant, because if the buyer had thought he 
purchased both houses he would have sent notices to all 
tenants. The court granted reformation in this case on 
the ground of clear and convincing evidence of a mis-
take. This case is also distinguishable from the case 
at bar in that the reformation is to decrease the terms 
of the instrument rather than to increase them. If the 
facts of the case at bar were reversed so that the con-
tract described a 75 foot tract, and the defendant was 
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suing for reformation to have it decreased to 49¥2 feet 
she would· be in the position of the plaintiff in the 
Cap~one vs. Rloberts case. There is a physical line of 
demarcation between the 25lj2 and 49¥2 foot tracts in 
that the hedge in front of the duplex does not extend 
over in front of the 25¥2 foot tract ('T. 4), furthermore 
the properties are assessed separately for taxes, and 
as a matter of fact the taxes as sh'own above were paid 
by Cathrine Jensen on the 25¥2 foot tract for the year 
of 1947 (Defendants Exhibit 2). 
There is uncontradicted. evidence in the record ( T. 
117) and also among the exhibits, to the effect that 
Cathrine Jensen purchased the two tracts of land 
separately, the 49% foot tract in 1930, and the 25~2 
foot tract in 1939. She obtained two separate abstracts, 
both of which are exhibits in this case (see defendant's 
exhibits 1 and 3). Surely she wouldn't forget that she 
possessed separate abstracts at the time Mr. Dowell 
came to her for the abstr:act on the property. If she 
had thought that the sale was to include both pieces 
of property, she would have given him both abstracts. 
This action on her part speaks for itself, that her in-
tention was that she was selling only the 491j2 foot 
tract, and consequently she handed to Mr. Dowell the 
abstr:a'ct to that piece only. Plaintiffs alleged that lf 
this were true, then Cathrine Jensen intended to de-
fraud them, but, of course, the lower court found no 
evidence of fraud, and therefore such a consideration 
is unfounded and is beyond the issue'S of this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Summarizing this argun1ent, the "~ritten contract 
described the 49% foot tract only, and in· every par-
ticular the instrument 'Yas clear and complete on its 
face. Such an instrument creates a strong presump-
tion that it represents the real intent and agreement 
of the parties, and such presumption can be overcome 
only by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. The 
only evidence of a mistake on the part of Cathrine 
Jensen is the testimony of ~Ir. Dowell, whose compe-
tency is very much in doubt be,cause of his being an 
agent of one of the parties, and also because of his 
direct interest in the outcome of the case. Can such 
evidence be considered clear, cogent and convincing, 
especially in the face of the evidence, given by the wit-
nesses for defendant, to the effect that the deceased 
had stated on several occasions that she had plans for 
the use of the 25% foot tract, and in face of tthe fact 
that the properties had been acquired· separately and 
were covered by separate abstracts, only one of which 
Cathrine Jensen gave to Mr. Dowell~ Furthermore it 
was Cathrine Jensen who paid the taxes on the 251f2 
foot tract in November of 1947, not Mr~ Sine. 
Appellant contends that if the court sustains the 
lower court in the reformation of this contract a great 
deal of the sanctity of written instruments es:pe-cially 
concerning the sale of land will have been lost, and 
persons dealing in land contracts will never have the 
security and protection intended under the statute of 
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frauds. Appellant earnestly requests that your honor-
able court review this record and reverse the lower 
court and direct that judgment be entered in favor of · 
the defendant denying reformation, and for whatever -
other relief to the court seems proper. 
GRANT MACFARLANE 
ROBERT S. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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